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INTRODUCTION
Martin Skhreli, the “Pharma Bro” and former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, outraged the American public when he raised the price of Daraprim—an
HIV drug with no alternative treatment—from $13 to $750 per pill. 1 Lost in the
outrage over Skhreli’s conduct is the fact that he was a small-time operator in
an industry that exhibits far more egregious examples of dangerous and socially
irresponsible behavior. The pharmaceutical industry is the most profitable in the
world because drug company executives persuade Americans to consume huge
quantities of prescription drugs that they do not need. 2 The average American

* Eugene McCarthy is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Illinois,
Springfield. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., UCLA School of Law. Thank you to
Riaz Tejani and Shara Murphy for their invaluable commentary.
1. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sep.
20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugsprice-raises-protests.html.
2. See Liyan Chen, The Most Profitable Industries in 2016, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2015, 4:19
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/12/21/the-most-profitable-industries-in-2016/
#6e3fc99c5716; see also Rolando Y. Wee, Biggest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World by Counhttps://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-biggest-globaltry,
WORLDATLAS,
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takes 13 distinct prescription drugs a year; 3 yet, since the 1970s, American life
expectancies have fallen well behind those in other developed nations. 4 Our use,
overuse, and misuse of prescription drugs contribute to this alarming trend. Prescription drug overdoses are the leading cause of accidental death in the United
States. 5 Adverse reactions to pharmaceutical drugs are the fourth leading cause
of American hospital deaths. 6 The prescription opioid crisis kills 50 Americans
every day while producing $55 billion in annual social costs. 7 It is revealing that
prescription drugs designed to treat the adverse side effects of other prescription
drugs are among the fastest growing pharmaceutical markets. 8 Indeed, many of
the drugs that doctors prescribe do little if anything to improve public health
and are both dangerous and ineffective. 9 Prescription drugs exist to generate
corporate revenue. As a leading industry observer puts it, “we are quite literally
taking pills to save the lives of companies who have a greater interest in the vitality of the diseases they market than in our well-being.” 10 Paradoxically, our
prescription medicines are making us sick.
In this Article, I argue that drug companies have created a highly profitable
but dangerous business model by employing the same legal tactics as the nineteenth-century “robber barons,” the group of financiers who orchestrated corporate law’s infamous race to the bottom. Like these historical financiers, drug
company executives have captured the legal apparatus and regulatory bodies
that oversee them. In so doing, they have transformed the law from a system of
governance into a set of enabling doctrines. The pharmaceutical industry has
turned legislation intended to protect the public into a legal justification for
marketing ineffective and unsafe prescription drugs. Like the nineteenth-century
robber barons who transformed American corporate law into a tool for maximizing wealth and limiting liability, modern-day “pharma barons” have corrupted

pharmaceutical-markets-in-the-world.html (stating that the pharmaceutical industry is a major sector
in the world economy) (last updated Apr. 25, 2017).
3. JOSEPH DUMIT, DRUGS FOR LIFE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES DEFINE OUR
HEALTH 2 (2012).
4. DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON 6 (2012).
5. Robert Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the Throes of Addiction: Why a National Prescription Drug Monitoring Program is Needed Before it is Too Late, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 117, 123
(2015).
6. Donald W. Light et al., Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe
and Effective Drugs, 41 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 590, 593 (2013).
7. Howard G. Birnbaum, et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence,
and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657, 657 (2011); Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr,
The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 9 (2017).
8. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 85.
9. Paul Jorgensen, Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A Theoretical and
Empirical Agenda, 14 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 561, 562 (2013).
10. HEALY, supra note 4, at 10.
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the laws that govern the pharmaceutical industry. The law now operates in the
service of the pharma barons and allows them to profit at the public’s expense.
This Article has three key components. First, it examines corporate law’s
notorious nineteenth-century race to the bottom. The race to the bottom is the
phenomenon through which financiers like Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and
J.P. Morgan encouraged states to offer increasingly lax corporate laws in exchange for new revenue streams. In this race, many states (e.g., New Jersey and
Delaware) revised their corporate codes in order to enable corporations rather
than police them. These legal changes produced great corporate wealth but little, if any, liability for corporate malfeasance.
Second, the Article turns to the pharmaceutical industry and demonstrates
that several factors have produced a contemporary race to the bottom in the prescription drug industry. Drug companies have transformed governmentmandated clinical trials meant to prove a drug’s safety and efficacy into a system of “evidence-based medicine” aimed at deceiving both doctors and the public. The drug companies employ biased clinical trials and ghostwritten medical
journal articles to create a dangerous illusion of safe and effective pharmaceutical drugs. These rigged clinical trials—coupled with the recent deregulation of
prescription drug advertising—enable drug companies to market misleading
“evidence” about their prescription drugs. Companies market these drugs
through controversial (and singular to the United States) direct-to-consumer advertising campaigns to drum up awareness of previously unrecognized symptoms and diseases. Legal deregulation also permits drug companies to engage in
private, in-person “detailing” of doctors in an effort to persuade them to prescribe drugs to patients for untested and unapproved uses that often prove detrimental—and deadly. The pharmaceutical industry lobby, the nation’s most
powerful over the last two decades, ensures that this new race to the bottom
proceeds unimpeded.
Finally, the argument concludes with an examination of the pharma barons
who developed and marketed the prescription drugs Vioxx, Paxil, and OxyContin. Collectively, the adverse side effects of these three drugs have resulted in
the hundreds of thousands of American deaths. 11 The drug company executives
who fraudulently marketed these deadly drugs have faced little, if any, criminal
liability for their actions. Indeed, they have become extremely wealthy just as
Gould, Carnegie, and Morgan did a century before them. While corporate law’s
original race to the bottom had beneficial outcomes that included innovative financial instruments and new and efficient economies of scale, the same cannot
be said for the contemporary race to the bottom. 12 Legal changes in the pharmaceutical industry have stunted scientific research and innovation while endangering American public health.

Davis & Carr, supra note 7, at 9.
See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
11.
12.
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I. THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM AND THE RISE OF THE ROBBER BARONS
The late nineteenth century saw the rise of larger-than-life financiers who
aggregated then-unheard-of levels of wealth, often at the expense of the general
public. This era, defined in part by its opulence and disparity in wealth between
the social elite and the rest of the population, spawned a new kind of business
person. Jay Gould, the crafty railroad and telegraph tycoon, accumulated the
equivalent of $58.2 billion in today’s currency. 13 Andrew Carnegie, the steel
magnate, amassed the equivalent of $281 billion. 14 J.P. Morgan, the first modern investment banker, earned a relatively modest $1.2 billion, but did so by
manipulating the entire United States economy for the sake of his powerful clients. 15 These ruthless financiers, whom historians dub the “robber barons,”
achieved this level of wealth (and, we will see, legal impunity for their actions)
in large part due to corporate law’s so-called race to the bottom.
This section maps corporate law’s race to the bottom, whereby the law
shifted from constraining corporate actors to enabling their pursuit of wealth by
easing and sometimes even erasing corporate regulations. These enabling laws
fall into two categories: (1) affirmative legislation that paved the way for greater corporate freedoms and (2) regulations that appeared to constrain corporate
actions but ultimately came to serve corporate interests. The race to the bottom
is the byproduct of several U.S. states competing with one another and “racing”
to attract corporate revenue by offering attractive corporate laws within their
jurisdictions. The robber barons and industry leaders catalyzed the race to the
bottom and blurred the lines between government and industry, or through what
J. Willard Hurst calls the phenomenon of legal “default and drift”—that is, the
purposeful imbrication of government and industry concentrated unprecedented
public policy decision making in private hands. 16 As a result, public policy
came to serve private interests.
A. Revising the Corporate Codes
In its earliest days, American corporate law looked like its conservative
English ancestor: incorporation was a rare and special privilege that the legislature granted, and the corporation was a “creature of the state,” bound by strin-

13. The All-Time Richest Americans, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2007, 3:00PM), https://
www.forbes.com/2007/09/14/richest-americans-alltime-biz_cx_pw_as_0914ialltime_slide/
#afac02139846.
14. Id.
15. Chase Peterson-Withorn, From Rockefeller to Ford, See Forbes’ 1918 Ranking of The
Richest People In America, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
chasewithorn/2017/09/19/the-first-forbes-list-see-who-the-richest-americans-were-in-1918/
#5f9de1ab4c0d.
16. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 78 (1956).
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gent legal requirements enunciated in its corporate charter. 17 These initial corporate charters (the legal documents that bring a corporation into existence and
define its capacities) established a number of mandatory rules for the corporation and drastically restricted corporate powers. 18 For instance, most pre-Civil
War corporate charters limited the type of business in which a corporation could
engage. 19 Any ultra vires corporate actions (those exceeding the powers granted
in the charter) would be void. 20 The ultra vires doctrine not only limited what a
corporation could do, but also dictated what kind (and what amount) of property
it could own in conducting its business. 21 These charters likewise restricted the
corporation’s size, life span, financial resources, territorial boundaries, and held
shareholders to “double liability,” meaning they had to pay twice their investment amount upon corporate liquidation or dissolution. 22 Early American corporate law also expressly denied one corporation the right to own shares in another corporation, preventing the creation of corporate subsidiaries and holding
companies. 23 In short, corporations were relatively small business operations
subject to strict government regulation.
This would all change when corporate law initiated its infamous race to the
bottom and began to enable rather than regulate corporate action. The historical
starting line for the race to the bottom is debatable, but a reasonable hypothesis
marks its beginning at the Civil War and the subsequent ascendance of the Republican Party’s pro-industrial political platform. 24 Civil War financing generated the first investment bankers and a public market for securities (the trading
of government war bonds), two of the driving forces behind corporate law’s early evolution. 25 After the war, the nation continued to expand westward at a rap17. See P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 237, 246–47 (2010).
18. Id.
19. STEPHEN A. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW 30 (2d ed. 2015).
20. Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions,
42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 184–89 (1936).
21. 1889 N.J. Laws 414. These changes in New Jersey corporate law indicate that the type of
property that a corporation could own and use was very much at the core of delineated corporate
capacities in the late nineteenth century.
22. Vasudev, supra note 17, at 246.
23. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780–1970 69 (1970).
24. See 2 CHARLES A. & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 52 (1927)
(describing the Civil War as the “Second American Revolution,” that ended in the capitalist coopting of the political system); see also HURST, supra note 23, at 140; MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE
ROBBER BARONS 51 (1932) (noting that Lincoln, whether he realized it or not, “hastened miraculously a transfer of power to the emergent groups of large-scale capitalism”); CHARLES R. MORRIS,
THE TYCOONS: HOW ANDREW CARNEGIE, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD, AND J.P. MORGAN
INVENTED THE AMERICAN SUPERECONOMY 10 (2005) (noting that “[o]nce in office, and freed from
Southern obstructionism after the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln and his Republican majority unleashed a blitz of predevelopment legislation without parallel in American History.”).
25. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 11 (2011).
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id rate, and the corporation emerged as the primary “instrument for mustering
and disciplining large amounts of capital and allowing dependable continuity
for its use.” 26 The corporation’s ability to accumulate private capital through
shareholder investment and then to use that capital to perform quasi-public
functions (e.g., build a transcontinental railroad, provide a city with water, etc.)
enticed the government to sweeten the deal for incorporators from both a legal
and financial perspective. 27 Federal and state governments granted corporations
great leeway because they were doing the government’s job for it. 28 The government evaluated corporate utility so highly that it warranted the use of law to
give “businessmen a free hand in adapting the corporate instrument to their own
will” and determined that the function of corporate law was to “enable businessmen to act, not police their action.” 29 In the blink of an eye, the race to the
bottom was off and running.
States subsequently began to eliminate restrictions on corporations in their
respective corporate codes. 30 These states sought revenue from in-state corporations while business promoters sought jurisdictions with less stringent corporate
restrictions. 31 This alignment of interests produced symbiotic combinations of
state legislatures and corporate lawyers who worked together to re-draft more
lenient and attractive corporate laws. 32 The next big surge in the race to the bottom occurred when New Jersey—the “Mother of Corporations” or, alternatively, the “Traitor State”—decided to openly court corporations in order to maximize this newfound revenue-generating potential. 33 In 1875, New Jersey amended
its constitution to abolish legislatively granted special corporate charters, ushering in an era of so-called “general incorporation.” 34 Under the special charter
system, state legislatures issued a sparing number of charters to incorporators
based on a system of political patronage. 35 In order to generate a larger stream
of corporate revenue, New Jersey’s law of general incorporation allowed anybody to incorporate in the state of New Jersey so long as they filed an incorporation fee, obeyed simple corporate formalities, and—most importantly—paid

26. HURST, supra note 23, at 34.
27. See id. at 62.
28. See HURST, supra note 16, at 65.
29. Id. at 13, 71.
30. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 30.
31. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
32. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 194 (1985).
33. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the
Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 323, 337 (2007).
34. Id. at 331.
35. Id. at 332.
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an annual franchise tax to the state. 36 Businesses flocked to New Jersey, and the
state quickly became the most popular venue for legal incorporation. 37
New Jersey emerged as the most attractive state for corporations because a
small group of corporate lawyers effectively wrote the state’s corporate statutes
to serve the needs of their clients. 38 The goal was to create as much legal protection and economic opportunity as possible for corporate executives and directors. Corporate lawyers from the industry subject to proposed regulation drafted
the legislative bills ostensibly aimed at curbing their corporate powers. 39 After
the 1875 move to general incorporation, New Jersey continued its methodical
program of loosening corporate law restrictions. In 1889, the legislature passed
a statute that allowed one corporation to purchase and own stock in another corporation, even if that corporation was incorporated in a state other than New
Jersey. 40 This law allowed one corporation to act as a massive holding company
with a corporate structure that included various subsidiary corporations on a nationwide scale. It also allowed a corporation to purchase another corporation’s
assets and to use its own stock, to which it could assign any value, as consideration for the asset purchase. 41 This wrinkle enabled “cash-strapped promoters” to
purchase another corporation’s valuable assets with what might ultimately
amount to worthless stock (the risk was on the seller of the assets, who believed—with good reason and from practical experience—that the stock would
one day be as valuable as advertised when the holding company was finally reorganized and began oligarchical price fixing within its industry). 42
New Jersey again revised its laws in 1896 to eliminate the ultra vires doctrine and to remove limitations on a corporation’s size, lifespan, and business
activities. 43 Single corporate entities like Standard Oil could now grow to dominate an entire industry, which only increased their wealth and political clout.
The 1896 Act also allowed New Jersey corporations to issue different classes of
stock with varying powers and shareholder voting rights. 44 This new power enabled corporations to issue non-voting stock, whose primary purpose was to
function as an asset to be traded on a capital exchange market, thus encouraging
investment for purely speculative purposes. Shareholders became speculators;
as speculators, these shareholding “owners” of the corporation became geographically scattered and largely disinterested in the corporation’s day-to-day

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 336; see also Horwitz, supra note 32, at 194.
GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916 95 (1965).
1889 N.J. Laws 414.
Yablon, supra note 33, at 341.
Id. at 343.
1896 N.J. Laws 279–80.
Yablon, supra note 33, at 352.
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business operations. 45 If the stock price rose (no matter the reason), they were
content. This left those in control of the corporation—corporate managers and
directors—in a position to use the corporation for self-dealing and selfenrichment so long as they could inflate the stock price, whether through legitimate or artificial means. 46
Because corporate managers decided where to incorporate, New Jersey and
other states that participated in the race to the bottom (in particular, Wyoming,
Maine, West Virginia, and Delaware) tailored laws to suit management interests
rather than shareholder interests. 47 In the event that shareholders sought to discipline or punish the corporation or its officers and directors, they found it difficult to pierce the corporate veil to reach key investors, individual directors, or
the financiers acting through the corporate body. In 1891, the Supreme Court
reinforced these increasingly permissive state corporate laws when it validated
the doctrine known as the business judgment rule. 48 According to the business
judgment rule, directors (at that time, usually composed of the promoting financiers and their intimates) were not liable for mistakes of judgment with regard
to corporate actions, even if they were “so gross as to appear to us absurd and
ridiculous.” 49 As a result, directors and executives could justify all sorts of selfserving decisions by couching them as mere mistakes in “business judgment.”
These deregulations allowed corporate agents to be the buyer and seller in
the same corporate transaction, fleecing both corporations while personally enriching themselves as a third-party beneficiary. 50 Likewise, late-nineteenth century corporate law did not prohibit insider trading (trading in securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information). 51 Financiers used “bear” tactics
such as rumors of new competition or decreased dividends to drive stock prices
down in order to purchase large blocks of stock. They would follow with “bull”
tactics (rumors of large dividends or new acquisitions) to quickly elevate the
stock price so that they might sell to the public at enormous personal profit. 52
This cycle of buying and selling stock at prices that the financier manipulated
was potentially endless. The corporate laws permitted other low-risk and highreward financial maneuvers, as well. Financiers and their corporations could
issue corporate bonds to the public to finance some large enterprise (e.g., build-

45. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 251 (1932).
46. Id. Berle and Means were, famously, among the first to identify this “agency problem”
with regard to the emerging separation of corporate ownership and control.
47. See generally, Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1443 (1992).
48. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165–66 (1891).
49. Spering’s Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872).
50. WHITE, supra note 25, at 199.
51. The federal prohibition arose in Strong v. Repide 213 U.S. 419 (1909); see also STEPHEN
A. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 519–24 (2002).
52. See MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 96 (1986).
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ing a bridge, a railroad, etc.). 53 They would then loot the capital raised through
these bonds by using a construction or service corporation that they also controlled. 54 Indeed, in many cases the primary corporate enterprise was created
simply so financiers could plunder that corporation’s publicly raised capital via
subsidiary service and construction corporations. 55
The race to bottom even turned legislation that was meant to curtail corporations into tools that increased corporate power. Take, for instance, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 56 The Sherman Act was designed to prevent monopolistic business trusts by making illegal “every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations.” 57 Federal judges unabashedly
turned this piece of antimonopoly legislation against the very organizations it
was designed to protect—labor unions. In the first seven years of the Sherman
Act, federal courts found thirteen antitrust violations, twelve of which involved
labor union “conspiracies” in restraint of trade. 58 In other words, when labor
organizations rose up against corporate monopolies, the government turned antimonopoly legislation against the labor unions to help reinforce the very corporate monopolies the Sherman Act was meant to eliminate. The race to the bottom subverted all meaningful attempts to regulate nineteenth-century
corporations and transformed corporate law into a tool that aided and abetted
corporate actors.
B. The Emergence of Nineteenth-Century Lobbying
This race to the bottom was made possible by a blurring of the line between
industry and government. This occurred in two forms: through lobbying of state
and federal legislatures and the emergence of a revolving door between the public and private sectors. James Willard Hurst observes that one of the most impactful legal changes to occur in the nineteenth century was the emergent power
of special interest groups—or lobbies. 59 Indeed, legal historians have noted that
the emergence of lobbying in nineteenth-century America transformed politics
into “a realm of economic competition between corporations,” whereby lobbyists who were often “ex-politicians, helped to move legislation and thus avoid
gridlock, but at a price.” 60 In one such instance of lobbying for favorable legislation, Oakes Ames—a member of Congress and an officer of the Union Pacific

53. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 92–93.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 92.
56. Sherman Act, 26 Sat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004)).
57. Id. at § 1.
58. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 919, 950 (1988).
59. See HURST, supra note 16, at 101.
60. WHITE, supra note 25, at 103.
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Railroad—distributed stock related to his railroad interests to other members of
Congress. The result was congressmen receiving stock in “a corporation they
had chartered, one they had to supervise, and which repeatedly came before
them for legislation.” 61 It is no wonder recipients of the stock payments routinely favored railroad interests in their legislative efforts. Collis Huntington of the
Central Pacific Railroad once lamented that he would have to pay $200,000 to
get a particular bill passed through Congress—a price he felt was too steep given his previous payouts. 62 And this was a small sum, all things considered. A
railway commission investigation regarding $5 million of unaccounted-for
money on the books of the Central Pacific Railroad determined “there is no
room for doubt that a large portion of this money was used for the purposes of
influencing legislation and of preventing the passage of measures deemed to be
hostile to the interests of the company, and for the purpose of influencing elections.” 63 Lobbying—or outright bribery—played a large part in securing legislation (and legislatures) that contributed to corporate law’s race to the bottom.
A revolving door between the government and private industry also facilitated corporate law’s deregulatory decline. During the race to the bottom, an
individual could have a job in private industry while also holding public office.
The muckraker David Graham Phillips demonstrates this fact through the example of U.S. Senator Chauncey Depew. 64 During his tenure as a senator, Depew, in addition to serving as a director on over 70 corporate boards, represented the New York Central Railroad corporation as its general counsel. 65 Such
conflicts of interest were commonplace throughout the government. While serving as U.S. Attorney General, Richard Olney also worked as counsel for the
Burlington railroad and repeatedly used his political position to secure government injunctions to prevent railroad strikes that were adverse to his private interests. 66 On the advice of railroad corporation attorneys, Attorney General
Olney persuaded President Cleveland to send federal troops—over the governor
of Illinois’ loud objections—to break the Pullman Strike, which was endangering corporate railroad revenues. 67 Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin wrote
and passed legislation on March 12, 1886, that granted major land interests to
the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad corporation in his
home state. 68 On March 16, 1886, he represented the same railroad as its lawyer
before the Supreme Court and successfully defended the railroad’s land acquisition, which he had just orchestrated as Senator. 69 Historian Gabriel Kolko notes

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 65.
See JOSEPHSON, supra note 24, at 84.
WHITE, supra note 25, at 129–30.
DAVID GRAHAM PHILLIPS, THE TREASON OF THE SENATE 64–75 (1964).
Id. at 63.
WHITE, supra note 25, at 385.
Id. at 442.
PHILLIPS, supra note 64, at 119.
Id.
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that “more likely than not, the average railroad president in the 1870s had a
background in politics—over half held some political job before or during their
careers as railroad presidents.” 70 These blurred boundaries between the public
and private sectors negated the government’s regulatory capacity to curtail the
power and interests of wealthy financiers and their corporate interests.
C. The Robber Barons
Three financier “robber barons” help shed light on the type of corporate
transactions that the race to the bottom made possible: Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan. These three businessmen used corporate law as both a
sword and a shield in amassing great fortune. They exploited intercorporate
stock ownership—looting corporations via self-dealing service contracts—and
industry-side collusion through interlocking directorates that the race to the bottom made possible. They each engaged in illegal and antisocial behavior that
harmed the public but faced no criminal liability for their actions.
Jay Gould used the stealth and guile that New Jersey’s corporate code revisions made possible in amassing his fortune. A contemporary of Gould described him as “the worst man on earth since the beginning of the Christian era.
He is treacherous, false, cowardly, and a despicable worm incapable of a generous nature.” 71 Recent biographies suggest that Gould, also known as the Mephistopheles of Wall Street, probably was not quite as bad as his contemporaries
suggested, but he was certainly a crafty man. Gould mastered the financial
world by cultivating “the art of controlling huge enterprises with minimal holdings, utilizing not only equity control but funded debt, the proxy market, floating debt, contractual flaws, receiverships, and especially legal technicalities.” 72
In his earliest ventures as a surveyor and tannery manager, he sought to explore
opportunities and engage in behavior that quickly taught his business partners
that he had no intention of conforming to traditional business norms. In one instance, Gould armed his employees and had them take over a tannery from
which one of his business partners attempted to exclude him. 73 In other instances, he openly bribed legislators, bought judges, betrayed business partners, and
in the case of the Erie Wars, actually “stole” the Erie Railway Company (well,
its stocks and ledgers) and rushed it across the state border from New York to
New Jersey to evade arrest. 74 His escape to New Jersey was successful, and all
criminal charges were eventually dismissed after Gould reincorporated in the
“Traitor State” and made the proper “political contributions” back in Albany. 75
When faced with the threat of state or financial discipline, Gould’s response

70.
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74.
75.

KOLKO, supra note 39, at 15.
KLEIN, supra note 52, at 3.
Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 83 (describing the situation as “the novel spectacle of a corporation in exile”).
Id. at 84.
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was inevitably “ingenious, strikingly original, unexpected, technically legal, and
ethically dubious.” 76 One might well apply these same five descriptors to the
race to the bottom more generally.
Two of Gould’s related financial transactions demonstrate his business ingenuity. In 1874, Gould controlled the Union Pacific Railroad corporation. 77
Due to his insider position, he knew that the corporation would soon have to
redeem government bonds at great expense to the corporate treasury, which
would depress the stock price. 78 As such, he quietly sold most of his interest in
the corporation and used the profits to buy into other railroad companies. 79 He
secretly began buying smaller, regional railroad corporations such as the Kansas
Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and the Wabash. 80 He scattered his stock ownership
across a wide field to veil his intentions. 81 His holdings “were too diverse and
sprawling for anyone to know where the heart of his system lay.” 82 At the same
time, using several newspapers he owned, Gould attacked out of nowhere Western Union’s monopoly over the telegraph industry. 83 As public sentiment
against Western Union grew, its stock price fell. 84 Gould began purchasing
Western Union stock as he facilitated a bear market for its shares. 85 He also
took control of a defunct telegraph corporation, the Atlantic & Pacific, and reincorporated it as the American Union. 86 He then illegally interfered with Western
Union’s contracts to arrange contracts between his new regional railroads and
the recently acquired American Union telegraph corporation—and got away
with it. 87
Gould subsequently stepped down from the Union Pacific board of directors
and threatened to combine his regional railroads into a national system to compete directly with Union Pacific. 88 Facing “ruinous competition” from Gould’s
new railroad network, Union Pacific was compelled to buy Gould’s railroad
system for $6.7 million. 89 Meanwhile, Western Union faced “ruinous” competition from Gould’s American Union telegraph corporation. 90 Western Union
proposed a merger with American Union, and upon the merger Gould became
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Id. at 144.
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the majority shareholder of the Western Union corporation. He immediately entered into a lucrative contract on behalf of Western Union with Union Pacific to
provide telegraph services. Essentially, Gould shifted from ownership and control of Union Pacific to ownership and control of Western Union, using different corporate bodies and underhanded tactics to make the shift possible and to
extract huge sums of capital from both entities along the way. His secretive tactics “enabled him to roam freely, a dealer in the unexpected. It was impossible
for others to know what he actually controlled, let alone discover his intentions.
He was the consummate one-eyed jack, an enigma, a phantasmagoria.” 91 All the
while he illegally invalidated contracts, used corporate attorneys to issue and
cancel injunctions, and orchestrated judicial rulings that perfectly met his needs.
For these reasons, to his rivals, “Gould would remain an image spread to infinity across a hall of mirrors.” 92 These enigmatic business powers arose from the
deregulation of business and the new corporate laws that encouraged such financial gambits. The stock-for-asset purchases and the new corporate structures
that the race to the bottom produced enabled Gould to “spread himself to infinity” through various industries.
Andrew Carnegie used fewer moving pieces than Gould in amassing his
fortune. Instead, he operated as an obstinate, self-interested, and monolithic figure in a single field: the steel industry. He succeeded by hedging his investments and ensuring that his enterprise took on as little risk as possible through
legally sanctioned corporate looting and self-dealing. Carnegie was always
looking for a way to climb the corporate ladder, starting as a telegraph operator
at the Pennsylvania Railroad corporation and ending as the owner of the monolithic Carnegie Steel Company, which he sold in 1901 for nearly $500 million. 93
He entered into countless enterprises with a small financial stake, “bouncing
from flower to flower,” until he saw a “good opportunity to scale up—
reorganizing, reenergizing, and recapitalizing—almost always emerging as the
lead shareholder.” 94 One of his earlier deals, the St. Louis Bridge project, is illustrative of his financial self-dealing and business acumen. He financed the operation by issuing bonds through the St. Louis Bridge Company (which he
owned) and selling those bonds to the public. 95 The Keystone Bridge Company,
which Carnegie also owned, carried out the construction on behalf of the St.
Louis Bridge Company. 96 The St. Louis Bridge Company paid Keystone with
the funds it generated from selling its bonds to the public. 97 The Keystone
Bridge Company purchased its supplies from the Union Iron Mills, which Car-

Id. at 254.
Id. at 421.
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE
RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 84 (1990).
94. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 91–92.
95. Id. at 92.
96. Id. at 93.
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91.
92.
93.
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negie, likewise, owned. 98 For good measure, the St. Louis Bridge Company
employed the one and only Andrew Carnegie, at a huge fee, as its investment
banker to place its bonds and sell them to investors. 99 The bridge opened in
1874 and the St. Louis Bridge Company quickly settled its accounts with Keystone (i.e., Carnegie), Union Iron Mills (i.e., Carnegie), and with Carnegie as
investment banker. 100 The bridge company went bankrupt within the year, leaving the bondholders high and dry, but leaving Carnegie with a small fortune
from the various construction and financial services he supplied (Jay Gould, incidentally, purchased the bridge for a song and used it as leverage in his Union
Pacific transactions). 101
Carnegie justified his dubious business dealings, quite simply, by “lying—
egregiously, consistently, and continually.” 102 Indeed, his biographers suggest
that he was one of the most prolific liars in American history. This same immoral mendacity accompanied Carnegie’s war profiteering, where he escaped
legal punishment for Carnegie Steel’s supplying faulty steel plates to the U.S.
Navy. A government investigation substantiated one of his disgruntled employee’s claims that Carnegie knowingly supplied faulty steel armor and falsified
the results of ballistic tests to the government, but the investigation could not
determine precisely who within the corporation had lied or plugged holes in the
armor plates. 103 The government imposed a fine on the corporation (not Carnegie individually), in the amount of $150,000—or ten percent of the transaction
cost. 104 Carnegie retained his lucrative government contracts to supply steel to
the navy after the investigation, notwithstanding the scandal.
J.P. Morgan did not have to hustle as much as either Gould or Carnegie to
attain the status of robber baron. Morgan’s father, Junius Spencer Morgan, was
one of the nation’s leading bankers and established Morgan in the family business. Morgan acted as banker and fiscal agent for the leading corporations in
most major American industries, and he held large blocks of stock in the corporations he represented. 105 He exercised “direct, secret authority” over these corporations by strategically influencing each of the companies’ boards of directors. 106 A congressional investigation later revealed that Morgan’s infamous
system of “interlocking directorates” held 341 directorships in 112 separate
corporations. 107 These interlocking directorates allowed Morgan to engage in
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unprecedented self-dealing between corporations and to exert undue influence
over the economy more generally. Louis Brandeis described Morgan’s vast
economic influence in the following terms:
J.P. Morgan (or a partner), a director of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford
Railroad, causes the company to sell to J.P. Morgan & Co. an issue of bonds. J.P.
Morgan & Co. borrow the money with which to pay the bonds from the Guaranty
Trust Co., of which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. J.P. Morgan & Co. sell
the bonds to the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of which Mr. Morgan (or a
partner) is a director. The New Haven spends the proceeds of the bonds in purchasing steel rails from the United States Steel Corporation, of which Mr. Morgan (or a
partner) is a director. The United States Steel Company spends the proceeds of the
rails in purchasing electrical supplies from the General Electric Company, of which
108
Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director[.]

Morgan controlled the markets to ensure that he and his clients came out
ahead in each transaction. At one point, Morgan controlled a third of the nation’s railroads and over two thirds of the steel industry through the U.S. Steel
corporation (the largest portion of which, incidentally, he purchased from Andrew Carnegie). 109 In addition to an incident of war profiteering in which he
knowingly financed the sale of defective weapons to American troops, Morgan
remained committed to influencing legislation (via bribery) to amend state corporate laws to serve his own interests. 110
Morgan’s primary and oft-repeated goal was to end “ruinous competition”
by creating large corporate trusts to engage in price fixing and market control
within each major industry. 111 The sheer size of his interlocking directorates
made it difficult to know which directors were serving Morgan’s interests and
which were serving the corporation’s interests. This industry-wide (or even nationwide) control was on display during the Panic of 1907, a three-week banking crisis that resulted in the collapse of several banking and trust companies in
New York. In the aftermath, credible accusations arose that Morgan helped orchestrate the Panic, enabling him to weed out his bank’s competitors and to
overcome legal barriers against profitable, but forbidden, corporate mergers. 112
This story probably sounds all-too familiar to students of the 2007 banking crisis. Morgan agreed to help end the Panic on the condition that President Roosevelt promise to refrain from applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to Morgan’s
acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, which he long coveted
but which would result in a monopolistic restraint on trade when joined with his
U.S. Steel Corporation. 113 Roosevelt agreed to allow the corporate merger and
108. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 269.
109. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 107, at 154.
110. See CHERNOW, supra note 93, at 370. Morgan’s “preferred list” or bribe recipients (in
the form of stock sales on a when-issued basis) shows the level of corruption the banker attained
and how little he thought of the laws that governed his actions.
111. KOLKO, supra note 39, at 65.
112. 42 CONG. REC. 3795–96 (1908).
113. See CHERNOW, supra note 93, at 128.
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the Panic ended soon thereafter. 114 Morgan purchased Tennessee Coal and Iron
during the Panic for $45 million; financial analysts at the time valued the company at close to $1 billion. 115
As this section demonstrates, corporate law’s nineteenth-century race to the
bottom enabled these robber barons to engage in complex, antisocial, and very
profitable behavior free from meaningful regulation and personal liability. New
Deal corporate and securities regulations would ultimately slow this race to the
bottom in the 1930s but, as the next section demonstrates, a new deregulatory
race is currently underway in the contemporary pharmaceutical industry. 116
II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE NEW RACE TO THE BOTTOM
In 2011, the U.S. government accused Merck Pharmaceutical of intentionally misbranding its pain-relieving drug Vioxx, which had adverse side effects
that killed somewhere between 60,000 and 500,000 people via heart attack and
stroke. 117 Merck executives were aware of these deadly side effects and concealed them from the FDA. 118 Merck settled the charges by paying a criminal
fine and no corporate executives faced criminal charges for their actions. 119 In
fact, the CEO who presided over Merck’s Vioxx decisions received a final corporate compensation package of $37.8 million in 2005. 120
The U.S. government accused Purdue Pharmaceutical of fraud and intentionally misbranding its highly addictive opioid pain reliever OxyContin, which
is the primary catalyst of the opioid epidemic and contributes to approximately
50 prescription opioid overdose deaths in the U.S. every day. 121 Purdue settled
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115. Id.
116. GERALD PAUL MCALLIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 333–34 (2d ed.
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www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-pharmaceutical-company-merck-sharp-dohme-pay-nearly-one-billiondollars-over-promotion [hereinafter Vioxx Press Release]; Alexander Cockburn, When Half a Million Americans Died and Nobody Noticed, THE WEEK (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.theweek.co.uk/
us/46535/when-half-million-americans-died-and-nobody-noticed; Matthew Herper, David Graham
On The Vioxx Verdict, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2005, 6:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2005/08/19/
merck-vioxx-graham_cx_mh_0819graham.html#2b3ed9175698.
118. Herper, supra note 117.
119. See Vioxx Press Release, supra note 117; see also Gibson Dunn, 2011 Year-End Update
on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, (Jan. 4, 2012), https://
www.gibsondunn.com/2011-year-end-update-on-corporate-deferred-prosecution-and-nonprosecution-agreements/.
120. TOM NESI, POISON PILLS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE VIOXX DRUG SCANDAL 255
(2008); see also Executive Pay, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/static/pvp2005/LIRE1B2.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
121. Davis & Carr, supra note 7, at 9.
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the criminal charges by paying a series of criminal fines. 122 The family who
owns and controls the closely held corporation faced no legal repercussions for
the corporation’s crimes and continues to reap annual profits of $700 million
from the sale of OxyContin and possesses a familial net worth of $13 billion. 123
GlaxoSmithKline paid a $3 billion criminal fine relating to government
charges that it engaged in kickbacks and fraudulently marketed its drug Paxil. 124
This fraud related to the company’s effort to convince doctors to prescribe Paxil
to treat adolescent depression despite the fact that executives knew Paxil triggered suicides in teenagers. 125 In the same year that GlaxoSmithKline settled
these charges with the government, the company paid its CEO the equivalent of
$14 million in executive compensation. 126 As these fact patterns suggest, drug
company executives represent the next generation of robber barons akin to Jay
Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan. The pharma barons reap profits
from engaging in socially irresponsible and illegal behavior and face no real liability for their actions.
In this section, I demonstrate that the pharmaceutical industry is in the midst
of a new legal race to bottom reminiscent of corporate law’s nineteenth-century
race toward deregulation. Pharmaceutical executives have coordinated a deregulatory push that has enabled them to increase industry profits at the expense of
public safety while avoiding personal criminal liability. This legal race to the
bottom has three driving forces. First, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962
instituted the modern regime of “evidence based medicine,” which requires
drug companies to conduct clinical trials to prove a new drug’s safety and efficacy. 127 Loopholes in these laws allow drug companies to use biased research
and publication methods to create the illusion of safety and efficacy that hides

122. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009). The government did fine three company
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Human Cost of a Misleading Drug-Safety Study, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2015), https://
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the fact that many new drugs are only minimally effective and have extremely
dangerous side effects. Second, the drug companies have produced and exploited the deregulation of prescription drug advertising. Through direct-toconsumer advertising and in-person “detailing” (or persuasion) of doctors, drug
companies now channel their time and resources into marketing prescription
drugs as opposed to scientific research and innovation. Many prescription drugs
now exist to capture pre-existing markets through sophisticated advertising
campaigns in order to generate corporate profit, not to cure sick patients. Finally, the pharmaceutical industry utilizes the nation’s most extensive lobbying
campaign (for twenty years running) and dangles lucrative job offers in front of
federal officials to erode the boundaries between government and industry. As a
result, the government agency tasked with regulating the pharmaceutical industry—the Food and Drug Administration—now serves the industry rather than
polices it.
A. Clinical Trials and the Rise of “Evidence-Based Medicine”
The government began regulating the pharmaceutical industry in 1906 with
the Pure Food and Drug Act, which required drug manufacturers to provide labels disclosing the drug’s therapeutic ingredients and prohibited the sale of misbranded drugs. 128 Then, in response to a scandal where the drug sulfanilamide
killed 106 people, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938
(“FDCA”). 129 FDCA, in turn, created the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) and required drug companies to seek FDA permission to market drugs
in interstate commerce. 130 In 1962, Congress responded to the tragic birth defects caused by the anti-anxiety drug Thalidomide by passing the KefauverHarris Amendments to the FDCA. 131 The Kefauver-Harris Amendments required drug companies to conduct clinical trials to prove a new drug’s efficacy
and safety and to disclose the drug’s adverse side effects. 132 Drug companies
assert that conducting the required research and clinical trials to secure FDA
approval costs an average of $800 million for each new drug they develop. 133
As this subsection demonstrates, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments and the
high costs of research and development tempt drug companies to cheat in their
clinical trials in order to gain approval for their new prescription drugs. First,
drug companies engage in “clinical bias,” which is the process through which

128. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 770.
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they rig the design of the trial to ensure that the new drug will appear both safe
and effective. 134 Then, to ensure that all the evidence points toward a safe and
effective drug, the drug companies ghostwrite journal articles and pay leading
specialists and doctors to sign their names as co-authors to lend credibility to
the studies. 135 If, despite these tactics, a drug company still cannot achieve a
successful clinical trial to gain FDA approval, they petition the FDA to conduct
a trial with “enriched enrollment protocols.” 136 Enriched enrollment protocols
allow the company to run a clinical trial with only patients who have, in an earlier trial, responded well to the new drug and to exclude patients who had adverse reactions to the drug in earlier tests. 137 (In other words, the FDA allows
companies to run clinical trials that are guaranteed to be successful.)
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments established a system through which a
drug company can only gain FDA approval to sell a new drug if it demonstrates
that the drug is both safe and effective. 138 To prove this, drug companies engage
in a long and arduous process of testing their new drugs. They must first identify a potential therapeutic use for the drug, and then begin testing the drug on
animals to identify therapeutic or toxic effects. 139 If the drug proves nontoxic,
the drug company begins three phases of human testing. 140 The first phase involves toxicity and efficacy tests on a small group of human subjects, usually
ranging between 20 and 80 patients. 141 If the drug still appears safe and effective, drug companies begin phase two of their investigation, in which they expand the testing to a larger group of several hundred human subjects. 142 Again,
if the results are positive the company begins phase three testing, which includes controlled clinical trials that test the drug on thousands of human subjects who suffer from the disease or ailment the drug is designed to treat. 143
These clinical trials compare human subjects taking the experimental drug with
a control group, who are taking either a placebo (a sugar pill) or an alternative
therapy that has already received FDA approval to treat the disease in question. 144 These trials are typically “double blind” studies, in which neither the
134. See id. at 1008–11.
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patients nor the doctors know which person is taking the new drug or the placebo—this safety mechanism is in place to prevent bias on the part of the party
conducting the trial. 145 If the drug company believes it has conducted two successful phase three trials that demonstrate “statistically significant” positive results over placebo or standard treatment, they may seek FDA approval to sell
the drug. 146 After the FDA approves the drug, the drug company can begin
marketing and selling its treatment.
These theoretically strong safety precautions have proven to be anemic (or
worse, dangerous) in actual practice. This paradoxical result arises because
drug companies have complete control over the design and execution of their
clinical trials. As such, they only report the “evidence” from the clinical trials
that have favorable outcomes. This results in a phenomenon called “clinical bias.” Marc Rodwin identifies clinical bias as the corruption that “lies at the root”
of the FDA approval process. 147 He has noted that an “ample record reveals that
drug firms can design clinical trials in ways that bias the conclusions” in their
favor and then compound the problem because they routinely “misinterpret or
misreport their trial data, or engage in fraud.” 148 Adding to the potential for
clinical bias is the fact that the FDA officially ignores failed clinical trials. 149 A
drug company might conduct as many as 100 clinical trials, where 98 trials
show that the new drug is less safe and effective than a placebo or standard
treatment while only two trials yielded positive results in favor of the new drug.
The overwhelming bulk of the evidence in this scenario points to the new drug
being more dangerous and less effective than a placebo or pre-existing treatments, yet these two “successful” trials are sufficient to gain FDA approval for
the drug. 150 In other words, it is possible to gain FDA approval for a drug that
clinical trials have proven to be ineffective or dangerous 98% of the time.
Drug companies likewise “hobble” the standard treatment against which
they are testing their new drug. In order to obtain the results the drug company
is seeking, the researcher running the trial administers the standard treatment
“in the wrong dose by the wrong route.” 151 That is, they administer the standard
treatment against which they are testing at a dosage that they already know will
be less effective or perhaps entirely ineffective. Under these rigged conditions,
the new drug appears to outperform the standard treatment in the clinical trial.
The doctors who engage in clinical bias do so, it is alleged, because drug companies pour an estimated $24 billion a year into the clinical trial industry, which
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accounts for the bulk of the annual funding these researchers receive. 152 Critics
of the clinical trial system describe it as “profoundly corrupting,” concluding
that “it makes no sense for the pharmaceutical companies to be the only one developing the evidence. At present, those who have the most to gain by finding
positive results in clinical trials are often the only source of information about
their drugs.” 153 Without independent third parties conducting the trials, it is impossible to know whether or not a researcher has strategically designed a clinical trial to produce biased results in favor of the new drug’s safety and efficacy.
If simple clinical bias proves an insufficient tool for securing FDA approval, drug companies have obtained an additional deregulatory shortcut with regard to conducting clinical trials: so-called “enriched enrollment” protocols.
Clinical trials that allow for an enriched enrollment protocol flip the FDA approval process on its head. Drug companies lobbied the FDA for enriched enrollment procedures because they could not conduct successful clinical trials in
which opioid painkillers outperformed a placebo or standard treatments like
Aspirin and Tylenol. 154 Enriched enrollment allows a company to start a clinical
trial without a control group, instead giving all the patients the new drug—in
this case, the opioid painkillers. Patients who respond poorly to the opioids
(typically half of the clinical trial participants) drop out of the study and the only subjects that remain in the study are the ones who respond well to opioids. 155
At this point, the researchers assign a control group and give them a placebo, while the other half of the participants—who the researchers already know
respond well to the opioids—continue to receive the opioid treatment. 156 The
subjects who receive the placebo, of course, undergo withdrawal from the highly addictive opioids, and drop out of the study or report negative side effects
(i.e., agonizing withdrawal symptoms) while those who already responded well
to the opioid continue to do so. The result is a clinical trial that appears to
demonstrate the efficacy of opioid painkillers in comparison to placebo, which
in turn leads to FDA approval. 157 Dr. Anna Lembke of Stanford Medical School
concludes that “the enriched enrollment protocol does appear to be a way for
drug companies to cheat, getting approval for opioid painkillers that don’t really
work.” 158 Industry observers have expressed deep concern over the “unsettling
circularity” of clinical trials that utilize enriched enrollment protocols, but such
protocols nonetheless persist. 159
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Drug companies also engage in “publication bias” to create the appearance
of scientific evidence that a new drug is safe and effective despite, in many cases, clear evidence to the contrary. Most people are shocked to discover that
there is a large (and entirely legitimate) “ghostwriting” industry in the field of
scientific writing. Drug companies pay third-party professional authors to draft
articles that portray their new drugs in a positive light—regardless of the findings from the clinical trials—and then place those articles in prestigious medical
journals. 160 After the drug company and the ghostwriter produce a final draft of
the article, they offer “thought leaders” and respected doctors tens of thousands
of dollars to attach their names to the articles to give the “evidence” more credibility. 161 This practice is so scandalous that it sounds like a conspiracy theory,
but the editors of top medical journals have been trying to alert the public about
this commonplace practice for years. 162 Drummond Rennie, editor at the highly
respected JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (“JAMA”), laments that he and his colleagues have published
manuscripts that we editors received in good faith, only to discover, sometimes
years later, that the “authors” had been anointed as such when everything but the
final draft of the manuscript had been completed by the company, their sole function being to lend the scientific and institutional prestige to the trials, and make
163
them credible to the profession.

Indeed, a former drug company ghostwriter who participated in these
schemes described her scientific writing on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry as “marketing masquerading as science.” 164
Sergio Sismondo explains that drug companies control every step of the
publication process through a phenomenon he calls “ghost management.” 165
Sismondo observes that “in extreme cases, drug companies pay for trials by
contract research organizations (“CROs”), analyze the data in-house, have professionals write manuscripts, ask academics to serve as authors of those manuscripts, and pay communication companies to shepherd them through publication in the best journals.” 166 Publication bias works in the inverse, as well. Drug
companies prevent researchers from publishing articles (sometimes through

160. See, e.g., HEALY, supra note 4, at 83–84.
161. Rennie, supra note 133, at 998.
162. E.g., id. at 991–92 (“In various ways I and my fellow medical editors are seen as representing the establishment. So consider this. Indirectly, the issue of money’s influence on researchers
and physicians has over the past two decades eased the departure of several of the editors in chief of
our major medical journals. My colleagues, Jerome Kassirer and Marcia Angell, both of the NEJM,
and Richard Smith, editor of the British Medical Journal, have all, the moment that they left their
posts, written books bemoaning the appalling influence of pharmaceutical company money on the
morals and practices of their profession.”).
163. Id. at 998.
164. KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 33.
165. Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429, 1429 (2007).
166. Id.
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overt threats and intimidation) about failed clinical trials that have proven a new
drug to be ineffective or unsafe. 167 This collective publication bias and ghost
management creates a false appearance of drug safety and efficacy that deceives
regulators, doctors, and patients alike. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments and
the clinical trials they require have produced a paradoxical outcome: the proof
that a drug works is based on evidence that the drug does not, in fact, work. Instead of protecting the public health, clinical trials function as a tool through
which drug companies produce misleading evidence about the safety and efficacy of their new drugs. Clinical trials and the scientific publications they produce, we will see, amount to little more than deceptive marketing tactics.
B. Contagious Advertising: The Primacy of Marketing over Research
The systematic legal deregulation of prescription drug advertising has
caused drug companies to turn away from pharmaceutical innovation and to focus instead on marketing derivative “lifestyle” drugs. Lifestyle drugs target
chronic, lifelong conditions that ensure patients will take the drug on a routine
or daily basis for the rest of their lives. 168 Drug companies focus on treatments
for chronic conditions because cures are not profitable; once a patient is cured,
she no longer has to purchase the prescription medicine. 169 Chronic treatments,
on the other hand, are very profitable: in 2010 the global market for pharmaceutical drugs approached $1 trillion, most of which stemmed from “chronic disease management” in the U.S. 170
As this subsection demonstrates, the drug company focus on producing
blockbuster treatments for chronic conditions has caused pharmaceutical research and innovation to grind to a halt. It has also endangered public health by
unnecessarily exposing patients to potentially unsafe medications. The grim fact
that drug companies now spend more than twice as much money on advertising
than they do on developing new drugs speaks to the primacy of marketing over

167. Rodwin, supra note 129, at 129; see also David R. Culp & Isobel Berry, Merck and the
Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 1, 27 (2007) (citing the example of Gurkirpal Singh, a professor at Stanford University’s medical school, who “said that a Merck
senior executive had contacted his superiors to warn that if Singh continued to express his concerns
about Vioxx he would have career problems in the future.”).
168. See generally DUMIT, supra note 3 (examining the industry tactic of getting Americans
hooked on prescription drugs for life out of fear of high blood pressure, high cholesterol, or other
asymptomatic “risk factors”).
169. See, e.g., HEALY, supra note 4, at 50 (“Marshall made overtures to Glaxo but found they
had no interest in a cure for ulcers. The beauty of H-2 blockers was that once they began taking
them, many patients remained on them indefinitely. Actually eliminating ulcers, the treatment of
which had just become the cash cow of the pharmaceutical industry, was not what Glaxo had in
mind. The decade between the contrasting scientific experiments of James Black and Barry Marshall had propelled medicine into a new world, one in which it could not be assumed that science
and business were on the same side, as they had appeared to have been over the previous three decades.”).
170. Id. at 10.
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research in the pharmaceutical industry. 171 The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) provided the deregulatory legal change
that enabled the pharmaceutical industry to shift its focus from research to marketing. 172 After FDAMA, drug companies abandoned the quest for cures to instead market the threat of disease and pre-disease “risk factors” to the public. 173
First, FDAMA removed the ban on televised direct-to-consumer prescription
drug advertising. 174 As a result, drug companies are now able to “educate” consumers and increase “public awareness” about a host of chronic diseases. Many
of these “diseases” did not even exist until companies created drugs to treat
them (e.g., restless leg syndrome, fibromyalgia, mitochondrial disorder). 175
Second, FDAMA and subsequent litigation eased restrictions on direct inperson advertising to doctors, or “detailing.” 176 Detailing is when a drug company representative meets with a doctor to inform her about off-label (non-FDA
approved) treatments for which she might conceivably prescribe the drug. 177
Doctors maintain the legal right to prescribe any drug they choose, even if the
FDA has not approved a drug to treat a particular condition. 178 Persuading a
doctor to write off-label prescriptions bypasses the time-consuming and expensive FDA approval process and helps the drug company to create substantially
larger markets for the sale of prescription drugs. It also makes patients unwitting subjects of untested experimental treatments that often have dire consequences.
The quasi-legal standard to maximize shareholder value has enabled drug
companies to seek out larger markets and to develop “blockbuster drugs”—
drugs that achieve annual sales in excess of $1 billion. 179 Ironically, research
171. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label Promotion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 696 (2014).
172. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111
Stat. 2296 (1997).
173. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 206.
174. Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 FED. REG. 43171, 43172 (Aug. 12, 1997); see also Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
175. KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 34.
176. Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2014).
177. Id. See also Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999)
(discussing the FDMA’s provisions regarding information dissemination).
178. See Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate
Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 654–56 (2013).
179. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 90. For the quasi-legal standard to maximize shareholder value,
see Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Clare, Fictions Inc.: The Corporation in Postmodern Fiction, Film,
and Popular Culture, 13 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 173, 175 (2017). In challenging this quasilegal standard, McCarthy observes that “[t]he book repeatedly claims that corporations are legally
bound to maximize profit (or, as corporate apologists say, to ‘maximize shareholder value’). This
catchphrase is a myth that corporate actors perpetuate to rationalize unpopular executive decisions,
like downsizing and outsourcing. The business judgment rule, which gives management tremendous
leeway in directing the corporation, makes clear that maximizing corporate profit is not an enforce-
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and development is not the key to producing a blockbuster drug. Drug companies instead copy pre-existing blockbuster drugs as closely as they can without
infringing upon the patent. They then attempt to acquire the preexisting market
through a sophisticated advertising campaign of their new “me-too” drug (i.e.,
our company makes an even better drug for that condition) that closely resembles their competitor’s product. 180 In his book-length study of the pharmaceutical industry, Joseph Dumit describes this new industry logic in the following
terms:
Once you take the perspective that what matters is not return to health but the
growth of prescription sales, it is obvious that patients are valuable only to the extent they can afford to purchase treatments (or have treatments purchased for
them). Often, research is directed . . . at me-too drugs, tiny variations on existing
drugs with very little difference in efficacy that can nonetheless be patented and
181
used to take over existing markets.

In some instances, a company produces a “me-too” drug that copies its own
successful drug when its patent is set to expire. This trick, called “patent evergreening” or “product hopping,” is precisely what the drug company AstraZeneca pulled off with its acid reflux drug Prilosec, or the “Purple Pill.” 182 As
Prilosec’s patent expiration date approached, AstraZeneca did not seek to develop a better treatment, but instead patented a drug—called Nexium, or the
“new purple pill”—that was in effect chemically identical to Prilosec. 183 AstraZeneca proved Nexium’s efficacy, not without controversy, by conducting a
clinical trial against Prilosec in which they “hobbled” the soon-to-be off patent
Prilosec’s dosage. 184 The result of the product hopping: an extended 20-year patent period for what amounts to an identical drug produced by the same company. 185 Patented drugs, of course, cost much more money than generic, off-patent
drugs. 186
The manipulation of clinical guidelines is another deregulatory tactic the
pharmaceutical industry employs to prioritize market growth over innovation.
Clinical guidelines determine whether a person is “at risk” for a disease and
should receive treatment, even if they exhibit no symptoms or negative health
effects associated with the medical condition in question. 187 Experts in a given
able legal dictate. There is no ‘legal corporate directive’ to engage in antisocial corporate conduct.”
(citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1968)).
180. See DUMIT, supra note 3, at 95.
181. Id. at 94–95.
182. See Hannah Brennan, The Cost of Confusion: The Paradox of Trademarked Pharmaceuticals, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2015).
183. Id. at 29.
184. Id. at 28.
185. Id. at 29.
186. See HEALTHSMART, Generic Versus Brand Medications, http://www.healthsmart.com/
PDFs/Generic-vs-Brand-Name-Drugs.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018) (finding the average price of a
brand name drug was $137.90, while the average generic prescription cost $35.22).
187. See HEALY, supra note 4, at 14.
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field establish a set of clinical guidelines that tell a doctor at what point she
should prescribe treatment to a patient based on certain test results. 188 Drug
companies exert tremendous influence over the establishment and revision of
these guidelines. 189 As the guidelines for treatment are lowered, patients receive
earlier and increased pharmaceutical intervention. In 2003, for instance, the National Blood Pressure Committee changed the hypertension (i.e., high blood
pressure) clinical guidelines to include a new category called “prehypertension,” which required earlier treatment at lower blood pressure levels. 190 This
change created—in an instant—45 million new patients to whom doctors should
be prescribing once-a-day for-life statin drugs like Lipitor and Crestor. 191 Nobody’s health or blood pressure readings changed—the pharmaceutical industry
simply helped redefine which blood pressure levels require treatment.
The American Heart Association revised the guidelines for high blood pressure again in 2017, which determined that an additional 14% of Americans now
had high blood pressure and should be receiving treatment. 192 Redefining health
is as simple as saying that while once 140/90 was a normal blood pressure reading, now 120/80 is the new normal reading. 193 Unsurprisingly, revised clinical
guidelines “almost always recommend more treatment for more people.” 194 As
one doctor describes it, drug companies are engaged in a process of “pathologizing huge swathes of daily life” in an effort to “coerce us into treatment for
conditions we never knew we had, with treatments that in some instances are
more likely to injure or kill us than improve our well-being.” 195
Changes in the laws that govern prescription drug advertising have enabled
drug companies to persuade people to become patients and to seek out their lifestyle drugs. Recall, FDAMA lifted the ban on televised direct-to-consumer
(“DTC”) prescription drug advertising. 196 DTC advertising for prescription
drugs is an extremely effective strategy for generating customer interest in a
product. Each dollar the pharmaceutical industry spends on DTC advertising
results in an additional $4.20 in sales. 197 This exceptional return on investment
results from the fact that when a patient requests a specific drug from her doc-

188. See id. at 136–37.
189. See id. at 129–58.
190. See DUMIT, supra note 3, at 164.
191. Id.
192. Robert M. Carey, et al., High Blood Pressure Redefined for First Time in 14 Years: 130
Is the New High, AM. HEART ASS’N (Nov. 13, 2007), https://newsroom.heart.org/news/high-bloodpressure-redefined-for-first-time-in-14-years-130-is-the-new-high.
193. Monique Tello, New High Blood Pressure Guidelines: Think Your Blood Pressure Is
Fine? Think Again. . ., HAR. HEALTH PUBL’G (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/new-high-blood-pressure-guidelines-2017111712756.
194. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 14.
195. HEALY, supra note 4, at 4, 14.
196. 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231); see also Draft Guidance for
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisments, 62 Fed. Reg. 43171, 43172 (Aug. 12, 1997).
197. Brennan, supra note 182, at 27.
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tor, the doctor prescribes that drug at least 75% of the time. 198 This, of course,
sheds new light on the familiar DTC advertising phrase, “ask your doctor
about . . . .” And since the average American views 16 hours of televised prescription drug advertisements each year (which is more time than they spend
annually with their doctor), a patient knows precisely which prescription drugs
to request. 199 Prior to FDAMA, the presumption was that it was too dangerous
to advertise prescription drugs and commodify sickness, which is why every
other nation in the world prohibits DTC prescription drug advertising (except
New Zealand, but there by oversight, not design). 200
Drug companies justify these ubiquitous DTC advertising campaigns by
claiming that they only seek to educate consumers about health, not to persuade
them that they are sick and need to buy medicine. 201 Indeed, some of the FDAapproved DTC advertisements are authorized for “educational purposes” only.
The FDA authorizes drug companies to air three types of advertisements: product claim ads (these inform about a drug’s benefits and risks), reminder ads
(these name the drug but not the benefits or risks of the drug), and help-seeking
ads (these “educate” the consumer about disease symptoms and name the drug
maker, but not the specific drug). 202 Of course, such educational claims are difficult to take seriously, and most medical experts recognize that DTC advertisements seek to “drive consumer demand for . . . drugs far beyond the bulk of
those patients who really benefit from them.” 203 David Vladeck explains the reality of DTC advertising in the following terms:
DTC advertising imperils the health of the American public by offering exaggerated, incomplete, and deceptive information about drugs. DTC ads are inevitably
misleading because it is impossible to present accurate and balanced information
about the benefits and risks of a drug in a commercial that is typically thirty to sixty
seconds long. Moreover, the proponents would argue, the primary purpose of DTC
advertising is not to educate consumers, but instead is to encourage them to actively seek out medication that their physician would not otherwise prescribe. The em204
pirical evidence supports that claim.

198. David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 259, 270 (2007).
199. Id.
200. Amanda L. Connors, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical Analysis of Physician-Directed and
Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB. L. REV. 243, 267 (2009); Susanna Every-Palmer et
al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Medication in New Zealand, 127 N.Z. Med. J.
102, 103 (2014) (for New Zealand oversight).
201. Connors, supra note 200, at 269.
202. Id. at 268.
203. Barry Meier, Med. Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec. 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/business/medicine-fueled-by-marketingintensified-trouble-for-pain-pills.html.
204. Vladeck, supra note 198, at 276.
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DTC advertising, like all commercial advertising, is aimed at persuading the
public to buy a product—in this case, that product happens to be a prescription
drug.
Upon closer examination, the pharmaceutical industry’s claim to be using
advertising to educate consumers takes on frightening dimensions. It turns out
that drug companies actually sponsor educational and so-called “awareness”
campaigns to drum up business for their diseases (and, subsequently, treatments) in a marketing tactic called “astroturfing”—the creation of an artificial
“grassroots” buzz about an issue. 205 The American Obesity Association
(“AOA”) serves as a prime example of drug company astroturfing. Dr. Richard
Atkinson, an AOA spokesperson, has been quoted saying that it is “time to stop
thinking of obesity as a problem of willpower, and start thinking of it as a
chronic disease that requires long-term treatment,” before concluding that “diet,
exercise, and behavior modification don’t work long term . . . the time has come
to start thinking about drugs.” 206 The AOA would later reveal that it received
the bulk of its funding from the major drug companies that manufacture and sell
diet pills. 207 When confronted about his role in this astroturfing scheme, Atkinson nonchalantly responded that “I think I’ve been pretty honest and uncorrupted by the money. But who knows, maybe it’s so insidious that I don’t notice
it.” 208 While advertisers politely call this tactic astroturfing, more pointed critics
of the pharmaceutical industry refer to this behavior as “disease mongering.” 209
These critics attribute disease mongering to the rise in “awareness” of dubious
medical conditions such as osteopenia, fibromyalgia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and restless leg syndrome. 210 And awareness of these diseases is
no laughing matter: experts believe the drug company GlaxoSmithKline will
surpass $1.2 billion in revenue selling a drug approved to treat restless leg syndrome, a disease that may not even exist. 211
FDAMA also loosened restrictions on off-label “detailing”—the in-person
advertising that drug companies engage in behind closed doors with doctors. 212
Before these regulatory changes, the FDA strictly prohibited drug companies

DUMIT, supra note 3, at 44.
KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 34 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 35.
HEALY, supra note 4, at 38.
Id.
Jim Edwards, Can Glaxo Make $1.2B Treating a Disease That Doesn’t Exist?, CBS
MONEY WATCH (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:54 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-glaxo-make-12btreating-a-disease-that-doesnt-exist.
212. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2008-D-0053, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE
PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED
MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2008), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FDA-2008-D-0053-0002.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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from advertising a prescription drug for a non-FDA approved use. 213 This longstanding prohibition was in place for obvious reasons: if a drug company could
advertise a drug that has not been approved, why have an FDA approval process
in the first place? Nonetheless, a drug company may now disseminate peerreviewed journal articles about an off-label (unapproved) use of its drug to a
doctor in an effort to persuade her to prescribe the drug to her patients on an experimental basis. 214 Of course, as the previous section demonstrates, the drug
companies themselves write the peer-reviewed journal articles that they then
disseminate as “evidence” to convince the doctors to prescribe the drug offlabel. An industry observer describes the pharmaceutical industry’s approach to
detailing, noting that:
[The drug companies] sponsor studies to produce evidence supporting off-label uses, oversee the publication of study results, purchase reprints of the articles, and
distribute them to physicians. Typically, these studies produce data that falls woefully short of what the FDA would require to approve the drug for the new use.
Nevertheless, the articles describing the studies often convince physicians to pre215
scribe the drugs off-label.

Detailing doctors to prescribe drugs for off-label uses pays off: at least 20%
of all prescriptions that doctors write are for off-label uses. 216 For some patient
populations, off-label prescriptions make up the bulk of treatment, as 50–75%
of cancer drugs are prescribed off-label, 80% of drugs prescribed to pediatric
patients are off-label, and 80–90% of prescriptions for rare diseases are off label. 217 It is estimated that drug companies earn hundreds of billions of dollars
each year from off-label prescription drug sales. 218
The high frequency of off-label prescription writing endangers public health
because at least 70% of these off-label uses lack significant scientific support
for the drug’s safety and efficacy. 219 Parke-Davis’s off-label detailing campaign
of the drug Neurontin—which one company employee referred to as the “snake
oil” of the twentieth century—provides a good example of the dangers detailing
poses to consumers. 220 Nuerontin was approved to treat epilepsy, but Parke-

213. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BACKGROUNDER ON FDAMA, (Nov. 21, 1997), https://
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/
FDAMA/ucm089179.htm.
214. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111
Stat. 2296, § 401 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
215. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 658–59.
216. Greene & Noah, supra note 176, at 241.
217. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 656.
218. Id. at 658. This calculation is based on estimated 2017 global pharmaceutical sales ($1.2
trillion) multiplied by the percentage of off-label prescription sales (20%). Greene & Noah, supra
note 176, at 241 (detailing the percentage of off-label prescription sales at 20%); Craig W. Lindsley,
New 2016 Data and Statistics for Global Pharmaceutical Products and Projections through 2017, 8
ACS CHEM. NEUROSCI. 1635, 1635 (2017).
219. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 656.
220. Greene, supra note 171, at 652.
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Davis detailed doctors to prescribe the drug to treat bipolar disorder, “pain,” and
migraines, despite the fact that Nuerontin was known to increase the risk of suicide in patients taking the drug. 221 The company actively suppressed evidence
that Nuerontin was not an effective treatment for these off-label uses. 222 In just
one of many off-label detailing campaigns that included 2,700 patients receiving Nuerontin via off-label prescription, 11 patients died and 73 others suffered
“severe adverse reactions.” 223 Ninety percent of all Nuerontin sales were from
off-label prescriptions and Parke-Davis made $2.7 billion from Nuerontin sales
in 2003 alone. 224
The federal courts have repeatedly upheld the right to detail as authorized
commercial speech against FDA attempts to more closely regulate the practice. 225 First, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, the court found that
the FDA could not restrict truthful off-label detailing to doctors, as the off-label
speech was protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. 226 Again,
in United States v. Caronia, the court determined that the FDA could not prevent truthful and non-misleading off-label drug promotion of any kind to doctors, as off-label promotion is no different than other forms of protected commercial speech. 227 The court reached this holding despite the fact that the drug
company representative—and defendant—in Caronia told doctors that the drug
Xyrem was “very safe” with no contraindications despite the fact that it carried
the FDA’s most serious safety warnings due to its dangerous side effects. 228
FDAMA has produced a legal environment that enables drug companies to
focus on profit through advertising at the expense of safety and innovation. Instead of researching new treatments, drug companies seek to create new patients. Consumers are inundated with DTC advertisements on the internet, on
television, and in magazines. Meanwhile, doctors prescribe untested drugs to
patients who are unaware that they are the experimental subjects of off-label
detailing campaigns. The legal race to the bottom in the pharmaceutical industry
allows drug companies to invent diseases, raise awareness for these corporate
constructions, adjust treatment guidelines, and then sell expensive prescription
drugs that are of little to no medical value to many patients. In other words, the
“industry has corrupted the system so that, in several ways, the system now
subverts the public good. Pharmaceutical firms have learned how to make huge
profits with drugs that do not much improve public health and that sometimes

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Carl Elliot, Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/opinion/useless-pharmaceutical-studies-real-harm.html.
224. Greene, supra note 171, at 675.
225. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(affirming that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection).
226. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012).
228. Greene, supra note 171, at 675.
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are unsafe or are prescribed without need.” 229 And, akin to corporate law’s nineteenth-century race to the bottom, this atmosphere of deregulation appears to be
the product of an intentional blurring of the boundaries between the private and
the public sectors.
C. Lobbying, the Revolving Door, and Limited Liability
In his canonical analysis of nineteenth-century government regulation, Gabriel Kolko observes that federal regulators often cease to function as industry
policemen and instead come to serve the industry they are supposed to regulate. 230 The robber barons that spearheaded the race to the bottom “realized that
they needed the protection of the federal government, and they became the leading advocates of federal regulation on their own terms.” 231 This phenomenon of
government regulation that serves and enables a particular industry is known as
“regulatory capture”—the system through which an industry infiltrates and directs the regulatory body that is supposed to control it. Industry leaders were
able to capture these regulatory bodies because they “thoroughly insinuated
themselves into the modern state. Through their lobbies and friendships, they
could be found in Congress, the legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts.” 232 Industry insiders blurred the line between the public and private sector by erecting
a revolving door through which members of the industry routinely joined the
government and, subsequently, members of the government seamlessly rejoined
the industry.
This final subsection demonstrates that contemporary pharmaceutical executives have infiltrated the modern American government and captured the FDA.
To achieve this outcome, the pharmaceutical industry has spent more on government lobbying than any other industry for nearly twenty years in a row. 233 In
addition, they have established a revolving door between the pharmaceutical
industry and both the FDA and Congress, such that in any given year more than
half of the pharmaceutical industry lobbyists are former federal officials. 234 This
political clout has resulted in an industry largely insulated from liability for its
individual criminal actions. The government routinely avoids holding individual
pharmaceutical executives accountable for illegal acts of misbranding, fraud,
and bribery. The government instead enters into non-prosecution agreements (or
deferred prosecution agreements) with corporate subsidiaries, which result in

229. Jorgensen, supra note 9, at 562.
230. KOLKO, supra note 39, at 168–69.
231. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
232. WHITE, supra note 25, at 511.
233. Dana Taschner, PLIVA Shields Big Pharma from Billions, Cuts Consumers’ Rights, 49
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 879, 902 (2012).
234. Id. at 903.
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inconsequential criminal fines that drug companies write off as just another
“cost of doing business.” 235
From 1998 to 2017 drug companies have spent $3.7 billion on lobbying
government officials to support industry initiatives. 236 This staggering amount
of money is $1 billion more than the insurance industry, which ranks a distant
second in special interest spending over the same time period. 237 Indeed, the
pharmaceutical industry has ranked first in lobbying expenditures every year
since 1999. 238 In 2009 alone, drug companies spent $272 million on government lobbying, a sum that still stands “as the greatest amount ever spent on lobbying efforts by a single industry for one year.” 239 It should come as little surprise that Congress enacted FDAMA (discussed at length above), which legallegalized DTC advertising, off-label detailing, and provided for streamlined
FDA approval, “following intense lobbying” by the pharmaceutical industry. 240
FDAMA—itself the product of special interest influence—produced additional levels of industry influence through its reauthorization of the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (“PDUFA”). 241 PDUFA requires drug companies to
pay a fee to the FDA to review and approve the drug company’s new drug application; these “user fees” pay for about 65% of the costs that the FDA incurs
during the review and approval process. 242 Although superficially these fees appear to penalize the drug companies, in actual practice the user fees have:
changed the entire culture at the FDA as well as its relationships with the pharmaceutical companies and the American people. The FDA used to have one client: the
American people. The fact that the companies it regulates pay user-fees for the service has meant that the only clients on the FDA’s case are drug company representatives. This is so even though the speeded up process results in profits that vastly
exceed the fees, and even though the actual contribution of industry to the finances
of the FDA is a fraction of that provided by public monies. The FDA now behaves
243
as if the manufacturers are the only clients worth serving.

In essence, drug companies lobbied the government to enact a law that not only
permits but also legally requires drug companies to finance the one agency that

235. See Greene, supra note 171, at 653.
236. OPENSECRETS.ORG: CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
top.php?indexType=i (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Taschner, supra note 233, at 902–03.
240. Vera Hassner Sharav, The Impact of the FDA Modernization Act on the Recruitment of
Children for Research, 5 ETHICAL HUMAN SCI. AND SERVS. 83, 85 (2003).
241. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571 (1992).
242. Gail Dutton, 2011 Budget Outlook: Trim, Cut, Then Slash, GEN: GENETIC ENG’G &
BIOTECH. NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/2011-budgetoutlook-trim-cut-then-slash/77899360.
243. Rennie, supra note 133, at 1004.
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regulates them. This, to put it mildly, creates a host of potential conflicts of interest. 244
In addition to their lobbying efforts, drug companies have facilitated a revolving door between the federal government and the pharmaceutical industry.
Industry observers have identified an uptick in the speed of the revolving door
beginning in 2001, when President George W. Bush appointed Daniel Troy as
the FDA’s Chief Counsel. 245 Incidentally, this revolving door arose contemporaneously with the pharmaceutical industry’s rise to the top of the list of government lobbyists. 246 Before his appointment as Chief Counsel, Troy was a
partner at Wiley, Rein & Fielding (and later at Sidley Austin LLP), where he
“represented pharmaceutical companies and trade associations relating to US
FDA and government regulations.” 247 In fact, Troy represented the Washington
Legal Foundation on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry in the aforementioned Washington Legal Foundation v. Heeney, the controversial case that established drug company off-label detailing as protected commercial speech. 248
In a very real sense, Troy went from representing the pharmaceutical industry
against the FDA to regulating his former clients from within the FDA. Shortly
after Troy’s appointment as Chief Counsel, the number of FDA warning letters
censuring drug companies dropped by half and the time it took to issue a warning letter jumped from two weeks to four months. 249 It was Troy’s job to review
and issue FDA warning letters. 250 After resigning as Chief Counsel of the FDA,
Troy joined the drug company GlaxoSmithKline where he served for nearly a
decade as General Counsel and Senior Vice President. 251
The current FDA Commissioner is Scott Gottlieb. 252 In addition to having
served on the advisory board or board of directors of six drug companies,
Gottlieb has “received some $413,700 from drug companies for consulting,
speaking or other services. In 2015 alone, he collected $199,951 from eight
drug companies, including GlaxoSmithKline, Squibb, Pfizer, and Valeant. All
are likely to have regulatory business with the FDA in coming years.” 253
Gottlieb’s predecessor as FDA Commissioner, a President Obama appointee,

244. FRAN HAWTHORNE, INSIDE THE FDA: THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS BEHIND THE DRUGS
WE TAKE AND THE FOOD WE EAT 153 (2005).
245. Id. at 145.
246. Id. at 143–45.
247. Daniel Troy, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dan-troy-701868b (last visited
Nov. 29, 2018).
248. HAWTHORNE, supra note 244, at 145.
249. Vladeck, supra note 198, at 273–74.
250. See id. at 273.
251. Daniel Troy, supra note 247.
252. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2018).
253. Michael Hiltzik, Farewell to Drug Regulation? Trump Nominates a ‘Bona-Fide Pharma
Shill’ to Head the FDA, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://beta.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-gottlieb-fda-20170315-story.html.
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was Robert Califf. 254 Prior to joining the FDA, Califf disclosed that the drug
companies Merck, Novartis, and Eli Lilly supported his salary at Duke University. 255 Harvard professor Daniel Carpenter called Califf “the ultimate industry
insider.” 256 After resigning as FDA Commissioner, Califf joined the scientific
board at Verily Life Sciences, 257 a company that has close partnerships with
GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Pharmaceutical, Biogen Pharmaceutical, and Johnson
& Johnson. 258 Compounding this revolving door problem at the FDA’s highest
levels is a recent study finding that, at a minimum, 27% of FDA employees
leave the agency to work with or consult for the pharmaceutical industry. 259 The
primary issue with these sorts of revolving door relationships is that “if you
know in the back of your mind that a major career opportunity after the FDA is
going to work on the other side of the table,” it can make these regulators “less
likely to put [their] foot down.” 260 Indeed, recent history has shown ample evidence confirming the frequency of this flight from the FDA to industry. As Fran
Hawthrone notes:
With the FDA’s relatively low salaries and generous retirement incentives, many
reviewers leave after 20 years, and the obvious move is to work at or consult to a
big drug company. This is what Tom Garvey did in setting up his own consulting
firm, and Susan Alpert did in going to Medtronic. So did Steve Koepke and Stuart
Portnoy, who joined the contract research organization PharmaNet. Jay Siegel now
runs research and development at Centocor, after leaving the Center for Biologics.
Michael Friedman, the acting commissioner during the tumult of the late 1990s,
became a senior-level executive at G.D. Searle & Company, then at Pharmacia
Corporation when the latter bought Searle’s parent Monsanto Company in 2000.
261
He also did special work on preparedness at PhRMA, the industry trade group.

The additional fact that 66% (926 of 1403) of pharmaceutical industry lobbyists
were once federal officials highlights just how blurred the lines between government and industry have become. 262
As lobbying reinforces the pharmaceutical industry’s political clout and the
revolving door blurs the line between government and industry, drug company

254. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA STATEMENT ON SENATE CONFIRMATION OF DR.
ROBERT M. CALIFF (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm487455.htm.
255. Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Nominee Califf’s Ties to Drug Makers Worry Some, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/health/fda-nominee-califfs-ties-todrug-industry-raise-questions.html?_r=1.
256. Id.
257. Leadership, VERILY, https://verily.com/leadership/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
258. Partners, VERILY, https://verily.com/partners/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
259. Alexandra Sifferlin, Is the FDA Too Cozy With Drug Companies?, TIME (Sept. 28,
2016), http://time.com/4510025/fda-drug-companies-pharmaceutical-industry-medical-reviewers/.
260. Id. (quoting Dr. Vinay Prasad).
261. HAWTHORNE, supra note 244, at 150.
262. Pharm/Health Prod, 2017, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/indusclient_lobs.php?id=h04&year=2017 (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
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executives appear to be escaping liability for their criminal conduct. The primary legal devices that enable corporate executives to avoid criminal liability are
the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) and the non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”). 263 Under a DPA, the “prosecutor and the corporation agree that
although the prosecutor will charge the corporation in federal court, the prosecutor will defer the continued prosecution of the charges until the end of a certain period of time agreed upon by both parties. If, at the end of the term of the
agreement, the corporation has followed through on its obligations, the prosecutor will dismiss the charges.” 264 NPAs work in a similar fashion, with the exception that under an NPA the government never even files criminal charges in
federal court; they only threaten to do so if the corporation does not comply
with the terms of the agreement. 265 Normally, the corporation pays a large criminal fine to the government and must agree to a number of compliance reforms
that are aimed at preventing similar incidents of criminal behavior in the future. 266 According to Brandon Garrett, the government relies on DPAs and
NPAs in prosecuting corporate malfeasance because prosecutors lack certainty
that they can secure convictions of individuals as a result of the “organization
complexity” of corporate decision making. 267 Another theory is that the government conducts a simple cost-benefit analysis: the government achieves the
same results (corporate cooperation, fines, admissions, and reform) at a fraction
of the cost of going to trial. 268
Legal scholars have also raised more cynical explanations for the government’s use of DPAs and NPAs to address corporate crime: corruption resulting
from lobbying and the revolving door between the public and private sector. 269
The use of DPAs to settle corporate criminal trials emerged as the government’s
primary tactic in 2001 during the Bush administration, which some view as “the
predictable response of a business-friendly administration to increased corporate crime.” 270 Indeed, the government entered only 9 DPAs with corporations
in the decade before 2001, while they entered into 39 DPAs in the subsequent

263. See generally CINDY R. ALEXANDER & MARK A. COHEN, TRENDS IN THE USE OF NONPROSECUTION, DEFERRED PROSECUTION, AND PLEA AGREEMENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
ALLEGED CORPORATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING (2015) (for a detailed study of the differences between non-prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution agreements).
264. Id. at 8.
265. Id.
266. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1848
(2015).
267. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 18 (2014).
268. David M. Uhlmann, Too Big to Jail: Overcoming the Roadblocks to Regulatory Enforcement: Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1324 (2013).
269. Id. at 1320.
270. Id.
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five years. 271 The government entered into 17 DPAs to settle corporate crimes
in 2017 alone. 272 The empirical evidence supports the finding that the government tends to enter DPAs with large, publicly traded corporations that have
high annual earnings (and, presumably, greater lobbying capacity). 273 Whatever
the underlying intent, DPAs certainly create the appearance that “large companies can buy their way out of criminal prosecution.” 274 As the next section explains, this erosion of corporate liability has contributed to the ascendance of
the pharma barons.
III. THE RISE OF THE PHARMA BARONS
Just as corporate law’s nineteenth-century race to the bottom enabled the
rise of the robber barons, the current legal and regulatory race to the bottom in
the pharmaceutical industry has elevated some drug company executives to the
status of what I call the “pharma barons.” As this section argues, executives and
controlling stockholders at Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, and Purdue Pharmaceuticals steered their respective companies through the development and marketing
of drugs that have collectively killed hundreds of thousands of people. Executives and researchers from these three companies exploited clinical trials, evidence-based medicine, clinical guidelines, DTC advertising, and off-label detailing in the development and marketing of drugs that they knew had efficacy
issues and deadly side effects. No executives from these companies have gone
to prison or faced meaningful liability for their actions. Instead, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, and Purdue have entered into DPAs and NPAs with the government and paid hefty fines to settle criminal charges of fraud, misbranding, and
bribery. Where once there was a Gilded Age, America is now in the throes of
the Prescription Age. The pharma barons, unfortunately, are proving far more
dangerous to the American public than the robber barons ever were.
The FDA approved Merck’s COX-2 inhibiting painkiller Vioxx in 1999. 275
Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market in 2004 due to fatal side
effects relating to heart attack and stroke. 276 The FDA concluded that in the five
years Vioxx was on the market, it was responsible for at least 60,000 deaths. 277
The entire Vietnam War, for the sake of comparison, resulted in 58,200 U.S.

271. Id. at 1308.
272. See Corporate Prosecution Registry, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L. LIBR., http://
lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2018). DPAs and NPAs are used interchangeably for this statistic.
273. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1870
(2011).
274. Uhlmann, supra note 268, at 1301.
275. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Vioxx (rofecoxib) Questions and Answers, https://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/
ucm106290.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2004).
276. Id.
277. Herper, supra note 117.
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causalities. 278 Other estimates suggest that Vioxx’s adverse side effects may
have killed as many as 500,000 people. 279 To provide additional scale, World
War II caused 418,500 U.S. causalities. 280
The story of Vioxx serves as a microcosm of the pharmaceutical industry’s
legal race to the bottom. First, Merck conducted clinical trials to test Vioxx under the regime of “evidence based medicine” that the Kefauver-Harris Amendments initiated. 281 Merck’s researchers and executives became aware of the
deadly cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx during a phase 2 trial in
1996. 282 In 1998, the clinical trial “Study 090” determined that serious cardiovascular side effects “occurred almost six times more often in patients taking
Vioxx than in patients taking another arthritis drug or placebo.” 283 Despite this
evidence (or, perhaps, because of this evidence) Merck proceeded to engage in
both clinical and publication bias to create deceptive evidentiary support for Vioxx’s efficacy and safety. The company ghostwrote articles that appeared in
leading medical journals and quickly it “became clear that in every case the authors [of the journal articles] either could not take full responsibility for their
trials, or there were distortions of the evidence that seriously weakened the conclusions of the trials that such drugs did not cause cardiovascular disease.” 284 In
other words, Merck doctored the clinical trial outcomes.
After securing FDA approval based on the biased evidence from these clinical trials, Merck began an aggressive advertising campaign for Vioxx, spending
$161 million in DTC advertising in 2000 alone. 285 Merck’s successful DTC ad
campaign starring figure skater Dorothy Hamill has since been pilloried for
turning “hope into hype” and pushing the use of Vioxx “well beyond what
could be justified medically.”286 Merck representatives also conducted in-person
detailing of doctors armed with the “Cardiovascular Card”—a piece of promotional material Merck prepared to reassure doctors that Vioxx was protecting
the heart, not harming it. 287 For obvious liability reasons, Merck instructed its
sales representatives to never leave the Cardiovascular Card behind with physi-

278. Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Apr. 29, 2008),
https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.
279. Ron Unz, Chinese Melamine and American Vioxx: A Comparison, AM. CONSERVATIVE
(Apr.
17,
2012),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/chinese-melamine-andamerican-vioxx-a-comparison.
280. Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II, NAT’L WWII MUSEUM, https://
www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/researchstarters-worldwide-deaths-world-war (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
281. See supra Part III.A.
282. Culp & Berry, supra note 167, at 18; see also NESI, supra note 120, at 107.
283. Culp & Berry, supra note 167, at 19.
284. Rennie, supra note 133, at 1000–01.
285. Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The
Case of Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749, 752 (2006).
286. See Vladeck, supra note 198, at 276.
287. Culp & Berry, supra note 167, at 25.
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cians after detailing them. 288 In 2000, Merck conducted another Vioxx clinical
trial in the hopes of gaining more far-reaching FDA approvals to grow the
drug’s market size. The now infamous “VIGOR Study (Vioxx Gastrointestinal
Outcomes Research)” returned similarly damning results with regard to cardiovascular risk. 289 CEO Raymond Gilmartin was present at the board meeting
when company officials reported these results to top executives. 290
Merck feared that public knowledge of the Vioxx cardiovascular risks
would reduce sales by at least 50%. 291 To allay growing concerns about Vioxx’s
safety profile, Merck issued a press release titled “Merck Confirms Favorable
Cardiovascular Safety Profile of Vioxx.” 292 In response, the FDA issued a
warning letter calling Merck’s misleading claims “simply incomprehensible.” 293
Contemporaneously, President Bush was attempting to appoint Merck executive
Eve Slater as the new FDA Commissioner; however, Congress rejected the appointment due to concerns about Slater’s status as a pharmaceutical industry insider (concerns, it seems, that no longer appear to trouble Congress). 294 Instead,
President Bush appointed Slater as the Assistant Secretary of Health at the Department of Health and Human Services, which conveniently oversees the
FDA. 295 Merck never received another FDA warning letter related to Vioxx. 296
After Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market, the Department
of Justice charged Merck with the crimes of introducing a misbranded drug into
interstate commerce, conducting illegal off-label promotion, and making false
statements about “Vioxx’s cardiovascular safety in order to increase sales of the
drug.” 297 Merck entered into an NPA with the government and one of its subsidiaries agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor charge of illegal promotional
activity and to pay a fine of $950 million. 298 Importantly, it was Merck’s subsidiary that entered the agreement—not Merck. If Merck had been convicted of
this crime, it could no longer participate in the highly lucrative state and federal
Medicare and Medicaid programs through which drug companies earn vast revenue streams. 299 All told, Merck made $11 billion from sales of Vioxx, a sum

288. Connors, supra note 200, at 262.
289. Green, supra note 285, at 753.
290. Id. at 754.
291. See Culp & Berry, supra note 167, at 23.
292. Snigdha Prakash, Merck Rests Its Defense in Federal Vioxx Trial, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Dec. 7, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5043658.
293. Culp & Berry, supra note 167, at 26.
294. See NESI, supra note 120, at 236.
295. Id. at 237.
296. Id.
297. See Vioxx Press Release, supra note 117.
298. Gibson Dunn, 2011 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and NonProsecution Agreements, (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2011-year-end-update-oncorporate-deferred-prosecution-and-non-prosecution-agreements/.
299. Id.
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which greatly exceeds the criminal and civil fines it paid in connection with illegally marketing the drug. 300 The government did not charge any Merck executives or employees with a crime. 301 After receiving his nearly $40 million compensation package, Merck CEO Raymond Gilmartin moved on to a teaching
position at Harvard Business School. 302 While at Harvard, Gilmartin wrote a
piece encouraging CEOs to prioritize social responsibility over profit as he
claimed he had done as Merck’s CEO—Gilmartin, notably, makes no mention
of Vioxx in his article. 303
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) engaged in nearly identical behavior in its development and marketing of Paxil, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibiting
(“SSRI”) antidepressant drug. The FDA had approved Paxil for treatment of
adults with social anxiety disorder, major panic disorder, obsessive compulsive
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 304 In securing these approvals, GSK
engaged in both clinical bias and publication bias. GSK had to conduct 16 clinical trials before it secured the 2 positive results it needed for FDA approval. 305
An independent review of GSK’s clinical trial data “suggested that at least 75%
of the benefit supposedly due to the antidepressants was also seen in the placebo
group.” 306 In addition to hiding these failed clinical trials from the FDA, GSK
concealed information that Paxil greatly increased the frequency of suicidal behavior in adolescents. 307 During clinical trials, GSK went so far as to move human subjects who committed suicidal acts into the placebo group in an attempt
to skew the evidence in its favor. 308 Indeed, the clinical trial data revealed that
an adolescent taking Paxil was nearly 3 times more likely to become suicidal
than an adolescent taking a placebo. 309 Despite this knowledge, GSK actively
engaged in an off-label detailing campaign to encourage doctors to prescribe
Paxil to children suffering from depression. 310 GSK even engaged in a scheme

300. Tracy Staton, Merck-Vioxx, FIERCEPHARMA (2011), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
special-report/merck-vioxx.
301. Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950 Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxx-case.html.
302. Ben White & Carrie Johnson, Executives Cash In, Regardless of Performance, WASH.
POST (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55305-2005Mar21.html.
303. Raymond Gilmartin, CEOs Need a New Set of Beliefs, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 26, 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/09/ceos-need-a-new-set-of-beliefs.html.
304. DRUG DEV. TECH., Paxil—SSRI for the Treatment of Major Depressive Disorders,
https://www.drugdevelopment-technology.com/projects/paxil/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
305. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal Standard, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073, 2098–99 (2013).
306. Id.
307. Hixson, supra note 125, at 222.
308. HEALY, supra note 4, at 214.
309. Hixson, supra note 125, at 209 (citing Medicine and Health: FDA Backs Child Antidepressant Warnings: Other Developments, FACTS OF FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Sept. 30, 2004, at
756C3).
310. Glaxo Press Release, supra note 124.

68

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 8:29

of bribery and kickbacks to entice doctors to write off-label prescriptions of the
drug specifically to treat children. 311 Executives sent a memo to sales representatives informing them that “Paxil demonstrates REMARKABLE Efficacy and
Safety in the treatment of adolescent depression,” and encouraged them to convey this information to doctors. 312 Thousands of children and teens ultimately
committed suicide while on Paxil. 313
In connection with its deadly fraud related to Paxil and other drugs, GSK
settled criminal charges with the government and paid a $3 billion fine for introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. 314 GSK has earned an
estimated $11.6 billion in Paxil sales. 315 GSK and the government also entered
into an NPA that protected the drug company from additional criminal liability
related to its illegal conduct. 316 No GSK executives were charged with a
crime. 317 J.P. Garnier, CEO of GSK at the time of the Paxil criminal investigation, likened government probes into GSK’s misrepresentations as “extortion”
and a legal system “out of control.” 318 In 2007, he earned $9.4 million in his final year as CEO of GSK. 319 In the same year that GSK settled criminal charges
with the government, it paid its new CEO Andrew Witty the equivalent of $14
million in executive compensation. 320 Despite the fact that these criminal settlements related to the company’s profiteering via adolescent suicide, the British
government knighted GSK’s CEO for his “services to the economy and the UK
pharmaceutical industry.” 321 If not a pharma baron, Witty has—quite literally—
attained the status of a “pharma knight.”

311. Id.
312. Brooke A. Masters, N.Y. Sues Paxil Maker Over Studies on Children, WASH. POST (June
3, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10979-2004Jun2.html.
313. David Dobbs, The Human Cost of a Misleading Drug-Safety Study, ATLANTIC (Sept. 8,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/paxil-safety-bmj-depression-suicide/
406105/.
314. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Side-Letter Agreement, (June 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/side-letter.pdf.
315. Darrow, supra note 305, at 2104.
316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 314.
317. Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithklineagrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settlement.html.
318. ALISON BASS, SIDE EFFECTS: A PROSECUTOR, A WHISTLEBLOWER, AND A BESTSELLING
ANTIDEPRESSANT ON TRIAL 181 (2008).
319. Tracy Staton, GlaxoSmithKline’s Jean-Pierre Garnier—CEO Pay, FIERCEPHARMA,
https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/glaxosmithkline-s-jean-pierre-garnier-ceo-pay
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2018) (total compensation includes $4.5 million in salary and bonus plus an options
bonus of $4.9 million that was payable in 2010).
320. Treanor, supra note 126.
321. Louisa Peacock, Glaxo’s Andrew Witty Gets New Year Knighthood, TELEGRAPH (Dec.
31,
2011,
6:00
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/pharmaceuticals
andchemicals/8985213/Glaxos-Andrew-Witty-gets-New-Year-knighthood.html.
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Purdue Pharmaceutical is the drug company that develops and markets the
opioid painkiller OxyContin. 322 OxyContin, due to its patented time-release
formula, contains a larger dose of the highly addictive oxycodone (a semisynthetic opioid) than other opioid painkillers. 323 Purdue began marketing OxyContin in 1996, and by 2009 doctors were writing 6 million OxyContin prescriptions a year. 324 This is a staggering number of prescriptions considering that
Purdue and other opioid manufacturers have yet to conduct “high-quality, longterm clinical trials demonstrating the safety and efficacy for [opioids] for chronic non-cancer pain.” 325 Indeed, even for short-term pain the evidence for establishing the efficacy for opioids is “weak and of generally low-quality, particularly compared with other therapies.” 326 Instead, drug companies that
manufacture opioid painkillers rely on clinical trials that use enriched enrollment protocols to secure FDA approval. 327 They are forced to rely on enriched
enrollment protocols because opioids simply do not work for the long-term
treatment of chronic pain. 328 In fact, in a tragic irony, one of the primary risks of
opioid use to manage chronic pain is increased pain stemming from a phenomenon called “opioid induced hyperalgesia.” 329 In securing FDA approval, Purdue has recognized the pivotal role industry lobbying played in bringing about
the enriched enrollment protocols. 330 Like Merck and GSK, Purdue also employed a ghostwriting campaign to produce false and misleading evidence of
OxyContin’s safety and efficacy. 331
Purdue’s most successful exploitation of the pharmaceutical industry’s race
to the bottom was the company’s manipulation of clinical guidelines and its nationwide astroturfing campaign to raise “pain awareness” in the service of OxyContin sales. In the early 1990s, Purdue began an aggressive pain awareness
initiative whereby:
Purdue provided financial support to the American Pain Society, the American
Academy of Pain Medicine, the Federation of State Medical Boards, the Joint
Commission, pain patient groups, and other organizations. In turn, these groups all

322. Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug
Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2014).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1119.
325. Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 562–63 (2015), https://
www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957.
326. Davis & Carr, supra note 7, at 7.
327. LEMBKE, supra note 137, at 68.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 59.
330. Martha Rosenberg, What Big Pharma Doesn’t Want You to Know About the Opioid Epi(June
3,
2016,
8:15
AM),
https://www.salon.com/2016/06/03/
demic,
SALON
what_big_pharma_doesnt_want_you_to_know_about_the_opioid_epidemic_partner/.
331. Paul E. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the
Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 137 (2008).
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advocated for more aggressive identification and treatment of pain, especially use
of [opioid pain relievers]. For example, in 1995, the president of the American Pain
Society introduced a campaign entitled “Pain is the Fifth Vital Sign” at the society’s annual meeting. This campaign encouraged health care professionals to assess
pain with the “same zeal” as they do with vital signs and urged more aggressive use
332
of opioids for chronic non-cancer pain.

Doctors cannot objectively measure “pain” like the four other vital signs
(i.e., body temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, and blood pressure). As
such, doctors must rely on the patient’s assessment of pain levels in determining
whether or not to provide opioid treatment. 333 Patients can sue doctors for not
properly addressing their pain—this new vital sign. 334 Given that up to 12% of
patients who receive chronic opioid treatments become addicted to opioids, allowing patients to subjectively measure the “fifth vital sign” poses obvious dangers regarding drug dependency outcomes. 335 The sobering fact that four out of
five new heroin users became addicted from using prescription opioids demonstrates the reality of this danger. 336 Nevertheless, in raising awareness of pain as
the fifth vital sign, Purdue sponsored 40 pain management conferences in a
five-year period where “more than 5,000 physicians, pharmacists, and nurses
attended these all-expense-paid symposia.” 337 Purdue also used a “patient starter
coupon program,” through which they provided patients with a free 30-day supply of the highly addictive OxyContin. 338
Purdue’s awareness campaign was successful from a business perspective,
as doctors wrote ten times as many OxyContin prescriptions in 2001 than they
did in 1997. 339 Purdue has generated an estimated $35 billion in sales since the
release of OxyContin. 340 In 2007, Purdue Frederick Company Inc., an affiliate
of Purdue (not Purdue itself—for the same reasons that Merck settled through a
subsidiary), pled guilty to “misbranding OxyContin by claiming that it was less
addictive and less subject to abuse and diversion than other opioids” and agreed
to pay $634 million in criminal and civil fines. 341 Purdue entered into an NPA
with the government, forestalling any additional criminal charges in connection

332. Kolodny et al., supra note 325, at 562 (quoting James N. Campbell, APS 1995 Presidential Address, 5 J. PAIN 85, 86 (1996)).
333. See LEMBKE, supra note 137, at 66.
334. Id. at 64.
335. Davis & Carr, supra note 7, at 8–9.
336. Anita Harper Poe, Prescription Drug Abuse: What Does America’s Painkiller Abuse
Epidemic Mean for Attorneys—And What Can Be Done?, MONT. LAW., Oct. 2016, at 26, 27.
337. Van Zee, supra note 122, at 221.
338. Id. at 222.
339. Tricarico, supra note 5, at 121.
340. Alex Morrell, The OxyContin Clan: The $14 Billion Newcomer to Forbes 2015 List of
Richest U.S. Families, FORBES (Jul. 1, 2015, 10:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexmorrell/
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#2daaeb1a75e0.
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with its criminal conduct at issue in the case. 342 Three company executives were
also charged with crimes, but all three settled the charges by paying criminal
fines of $5,000, respectively. 343 Pursuant to an indemnification agreement, Purdue paid the fines on behalf of its executives. 344 Not mentioned in the criminal
charges or plea agreement are members of the Sackler family who own and control Purdue 345 and who have an estimated cumulative net worth of $13 billion,
the bulk of which has been derived through OxyContin sales. 346 Experts have
attributed the “lion’s share” of the prescription opioid crisis to Purdue’s marketing of OxyContin. 347 Purdue has recently suggested that they will cease advertising OxyContin directly to doctors, but industry observers suggest that this
public-relations gesture will do little, if anything, to curb the prescription opioid
crisis. 348 The ongoing prescription opioid crisis has killed hundreds of thousands of people, with nearly 20,000 Americans dying from prescription opioid
overdoses each year. 349 As of 2016, the Sacklers were ranked as the nineteenth
richest family in America. 350
CONCLUSION
A group of respected legal scholars have rebranded corporate law’s race to
the bottom as a “race to the top,” whereby the competition between states for
corporate charters tended toward “optimal legal systems regulating the market
for capital.” 351 That is, state competition for corporate charters culled away outdated and unnecessary regulations and paved the way for an era of unrivaled
economic growth and efficiency. Indeed, financiers like Gould, Carnegie, and
Morgan produced the steel, laid the tracks for, and helped finance the transcontinental railroad that ushered in the era of American economic dominance on a
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global scale. 352 Regardless of one’s ideological viewpoint concerning modern
corporate capitalism, it is undeniable that the race to the bottom made possible
vertically integrated consolidation companies and new economies of scale that
have benefited the nation in one form or another. 353 That is to say, it is not unreasonable to make the argument that the nineteenth-century race to the bottom
was (at least in part) a race to the top, in that it produced efficiency, innovation,
and new luxuries available in mass markets.
The same cannot be said for the pharmaceutical industry’s contemporary
race to the bottom. 354 In addition to the widespread and deadly side effects described in detail throughout this Article, there is a growing scholarly consensus
that drug companies have ceased to innovate and now only imitate. 355 The perverse result of corporate law’s contemporary race to the bottom is that drug
companies are now incentivized to produce “the most minimally effective, the
most ineffective effective drug.” 356 If a drug company can eke out two clinical
trials that “prove” that a “new” allergy medicine (a “me-too” molecular
knockoff of an existing treatment) out-performs the current treatment (through
hobbled and biased trials), they now have a patented drug to advertise to a preexisting, mass market of individuals who they hope will take their drug every
day for the rest of their lives. As patients, we have to hope that the drug company has not buried a host of failed trials that reveal adverse side effects relating
to heart attacks, suicidal thoughts, or a high possibility of subsequent heroin addiction. If nothing else, awareness of the pharma barons might cause some patients to think twice the next time a doctor prescribes them a once-a-day drug
for the rest of their lives to treat “risk factors” for a “disease” that appears to
have no symptoms.
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drugs that treat chronic ailments as opposed to seeking cures for dangerous diseases. If one major
pharmaceutical company produces a successful blockbuster treatment, each of the other major companies quickly produce a “me-too” drug and attempt to access this new market by advertising a similar drug instead of seeking a more innovative treatment).
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